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Compulsory Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Clauses In The Employment Context
After EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton
& Scripps-
Maria Wusinich2
I. INTRODUCTION
In EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps,3 decided in 2003, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals aligned its view with its sister circuits and with
the Supreme Court regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements in
employment discrimination cases.' The court held that an employee's agree-
ment to arbitrate a claim arising under federal anti-discrimination law is en-
forceable.5 At first glance, it would appear that as far as the judicial branch is
concerned, the longstanding issue of the validity of mandatory arbitration
agreements in the employment context is now settled. This article, in contrast,
posits that the courts will be called to revisit this issue as it becomes more ap-
parent that compelled arbitration is not an appropriate method for resolving
employment discrimination claims, and that enforcing agreements to arbitrate
such claims undermines the goals of the anti-discrimination statutes found in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the 1964 CRA) and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act (the 1991 CRA) 6. Likewise, albeit less obviously, enforcing com-
pulsory pre-dispute arbitration clauses also contravene the purposes of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA).7
1. 345 F.3d 742 (2003).
2. J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University School of Law, 2005. Many thanks to my Mom
and Dad and sisters, Nicole, Dana, Christa, Joanna, and Catherine for their love and support in all of
my endeavors, and to Travis Daily, Kristen Morse, Melissa Niemann, and Demetra Edwards for their
encouragement. Comments welcome at maria.wusinich@pepperdine.edu.
3. 345 F.3d 742.
4. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
5. See Luce, 345 F.3d at 750.
6. See Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2004); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
7. 9U.S.C.§§ 1-16(2004).
1
Wusinich: Compulsory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses in the Employment Cont
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
The next section, Part II, discusses the FAA and the federal civil rights stat-
utes which lie at the heart of the dispute. Part III presents the key Supreme
Court holdings on enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses, and illustrates the
evolution of the Court's view from one supporting the public resolution of statu-
tory discrimination claims in a judicial forum, to its current view in favor of
arbitrating employment disputes. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Luce. Part V presents arguments against enforcing mandatory arbitration
agreements in the employment context. Part VI describes legislation pending in
Congress which, if enacted, would reverse the trend towards enforcing compul-
sory arbitration clauses. In conclusion, Part VII reiterates the unsettled nature of
the enforceability issue despite apparent agreement in the judiciary, and suggests
ways to ensure appropriate procedures for the resolution of pending statutory
employment discrimination claims.
II. THE STATUTORY LAW: BACKGROUND
The contrary goals of federal anti-discrimination statutes and the FAA have
created a tension which underlies judicial decisions regarding the enforceability
of mandatory arbitration agreements.8 As will be discussed below, the two sets
of legislation conflict with each other to the extent that they address agreements
to arbitrate causes of action created by Title VII and the 1991 CRA.9 It is there-
fore no surprise that in discrimination cases, the statutes' competing policies
have resulted in a jurisprudence described by one commentator as "the Chinese
puzzle of mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims.""0
8. "A binding arbitration agreement is a prospective agreement between an employer and an
employee to require some or all future employment disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration.
Binding arbitration provisions can be created as stand-alone agreements" or they can be part of a
broader, written employment agreement. Donna K. McElroy, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements.
. . Issues Concerning the Enforcement of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers
and Employees, 31 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1015, 1025-26 (2000). Mandatory arbitration clauses in em-
ployment contracts often present a "take-it-or-leave-it" approach, and as such, are contracts of adhe-
sion. Nicole Karas, EEOC v. Luce and the Mandatory Arbitration Agreement, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
67, 105 (2003).
9. The FAA, according to the Supreme Court, was Congress's legislative pronouncement
that arbitration is a preferred method of dispute resolution. McElroy, supra note 9, at 1019 (quoting
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). Conversely, the purpose of the
1991 CRA was to make it easier to bring lawsuits and provide increased judicial remedies in order to
fully compensate plaintiffs for injuries caused by discrimination. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens &
Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by EEOC v. Luce, Forward,
Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2003).
10. M. Lane Lowrey, Arbitration or Adjudication?: The Trials and Tribulations of the Fed-
eral Circuit Split Over Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 40 S. TEx. L.
REV. 993, 1021 (1999).
58
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A. The FAA
Congress enacted the FAA" in 1925 to accomplish two purposes. First, it
intended "to reverse the common law rule barring specific performance of arbi-
tration agreements." 12 Second, Congress wanted "to allow parties to avoid the
costliness and delays of litigation by permitting a less expensive forum for the
resolution of disputes." 3
In order to achieve these goals, provisions of the Act dictate that district
courts stay litigation and compel arbitration when one party refuses to arbi-
trate. 14 Thus, the FAA prevents federal courts from hearing disputes that the
parties have agreed to arbitrate. Furthermore, since its enactment, the Supreme
Court has interpreted the FAA to apply in state courts, and to preempt conflict-
ing state anti-arbitration laws.' 5 Notwithstanding its broad application, how-
ever, the FAA is limited in that it is authorized by the Commerce Clause, and
thus applies only to maritime transactions and transactions involving com-
merce. 16
1. The Section 1 Exclusion
Section 1 of the FAA states, in the relevant part, "nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."'" Before the
Supreme Court decided Circuit City Stores in March 2001,1 there was dis-
agreement as to whether this provision applied to (i) the employment contracts
of all workers within the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power or (ii)
II. 9U.S.C.§§ 1-16(2004).
12. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 404 (1999). "Traditionally, the common law courts had been hostile to
the concept of private party arbitration as a means to resolve disputes. The [FAA] ... was intended
to overcome that hostility, and to place agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as any other
contracts with regard to judicial enforcement." Patrick J. Cihon & Elizabeth C. Wesman, Arbitra-
tion of Title VII Disputes: Resolving the Conflicting Policies of Circuit City and Waffle House, 16th
Annual International Association for Conflict Management Conference Melbourne, Australia
(2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-398180.
13. Moohr, supra note 12, at 404.
14. Id. at 404-05. The Act also authorizes interlocutory appeal of a trial court's decision to
refuse a stay of litigation. Id. at 405.
15. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001) (quoting Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
16. Moohr, supra note 12, at 404; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
18. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 105.
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only to employment contracts of those workers engaged in the interstate ship-
ment of goods. 9 A court's interpretation of Section 1 as broad the first interpre-
tation or as narrow as the latter view was significant because it impacted
whether agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims were ex-
cluded from the reach of the FAA.20 Furthermore, a court's interpretation of the
exclusion determined whether the policy favoring arbitration should be consid-
ered. Nevertheless, the proper interpretation of Section 1 is no longer debatable.
In Circuit City Stores,2' the Supreme Court held that the narrower interpretation
was proper; only the contracts of workers involved in the interstate transporta-
tion of goods are exempt from the reach of FAA.22
2. Section 2
Section 2, the "centerpiece"23 of the FAA states, "[a] written provision in
any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."24 Sig-
nificantly, the Supreme Court's holding that the FAA is applicable to employ-
ment contracts25 imported the FAA policy urging the voluntary resolution of
disputes through arbitration to the employment arena.26
3. Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 is one of the three main federal
statutes which prohibit discrimination in employment.28 Title VII was enacted
19. Paul H. Tobias, 1 Lit. Wrong. Discharge Claims § 2.9 (last updated July 2004). Specifi-
cally, the First, Second, Third, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have "explicitly
held that the § 1 exemption applies only to contracts of employment for workers involved in, or
closely related to, the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce." Donna Meredith Mat-
thews, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination
Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 368 (1997). The Sixth Circuit held in dicta, but then
later rejected, a broad interpretation of the exception. Id. at 369. Its district courts followed this
interpretation. Id. The Fourth Circuit declined to adopt the narrow construction, and the Ninth
Circuit characterized the question as "unresolved." Id.
20. Lowrey, supra note 10, at 995.
21. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 105.
22. See id. at 119.
23. Moohr, supra note 12, at 404.
24. Lowrey, supra note 10, at 1000. This clause provides for the challenging of arbitration
agreements on the same principles used to avoid contracts: fraud, duress, and lack of consideration.
Id. at 995.
25. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 119.
26. Cihon & Wesman, supra note 12, at 16.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2004).
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to end discrimination against employees on the basis of "race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.' '29 In order to effectuate this purpose, Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to serve as the pri-
mary enforcement mechanism of the Civil Rights Act.3" Congress invested the
EEOC with broad powers under the original Act.31
In 1991, when more women and minority laborers were needed to maintain
the health and vitality of the U.S. economy, Congress amended the Act to
strengthen federal equal employment protection.32 The 1991 CRA
had two primary goals: (1) to 'restore... civil rights laws' by 'overruling' a series of 1989
Supreme Court decisions that Congress thought represented an unduly narrow and restrictive
reading of Title VII . . ., and (2) to 'strengthen' Title VII by making it easier to bring and to
prove lawsuits, and by increasing the available judicial remedies so that plaintiffs could be
fully compensated for injuries resulting from discrimination. 33
The 1991 CRA provided claimants a right to damages and to trial by jury
for the first time.3 4 The effect of the Act was to expand employees' rights and to
increase the remedies available to plaintiffs claiming violations of their civil
rights."s
III. SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
A. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
31
Several key cases illustrate the Supreme Court's changed attitude towards
mandatory arbitration agreements. First, in 1974, the Court decided a case in-
28. Lowrey, supra note 10, at 994. The other two statutes are the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. "The ADA prohibits
discrimination against individuals who have impairments that substantially impede one or more
major life activities, who have records of such disabilities, or who are perceived as being disabled."
Id. The ADEA "protects individuals who are forty years of age or older, from discrimination in
hiring or terms of employment." Id. at 995.
29. Id. at 994.
30. Marc A. Altenbernt, Will EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. Signal the Beginning of the End for
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Context?, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 221
(2003).
31. Id.at221-22.
32. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190-91.
33. Id. at 1191 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1994), which
enumerates some of those decisions, including Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164
(1989), and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1192.
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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volving an employee who was discharged and filed a grievance alleging that the
discharge was racially motivated and thus violated Title VII." The case was
arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) to which the employee was a party. 8 The arbitrator in the
case failed to specifically address the racial discrimination claim, but nonethe-
less found just cause for the employee's discharge.39 The issue before the Court
was whether, in the aftermath of the arbitration, the employee retained the right
to bring a Title VII claim on his own behalf. °
The Court held in the affirmative. 1 It found that the purpose of the arbitra-
tion proceeding had been to enforce the employee's rights under the CBA. 2
The Court then stated that Title VII claims serve a different purpose: to further
the public policy of combating employment discrimination.13 Thus, it would be
inappropriate to hold that the arbitration proceeding, a private remedy, extin-
guished the employee's Title VII statutory rights.'
B. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 4
Almost a decade later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., a case which involved claims arising under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, the Court held that the FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration agree-
ments encompassed statutory claims.' Specifically, the Court stated that the
presumption favoring arbitration would be trumped only if the statute at issue
expressed a congressional intent that claims arising under it not be arbitrated.47
The Court concluded that, without this express congressional intent, a judicial
forum was not a substantive right. " Rather, "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statu-
37. Id. at 36.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 38.
40. Id.
41. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47-52.
42. Id. at 49.
43. Id. at 48-49.
44. Id.
45. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
46. Id. at 616, 628. In one commentator's view, the Court in 1985 began "radically interpret-
ing the FAA. The Court announced an 'emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolu-
tion' .... Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 1039, 1039-1040 (1998) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.,
supra note 56, at 631).
47. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627-28 ("Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the
party should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."); Rebecca Hanner White, Arbitration and the
Administrative State, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1283, 1292 (2003).
48. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
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tory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."49
C. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. "
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., decided in 1991, solidified the
Court's new position favoring the arbitration of employment disputes." Gilmer
involved a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
rather than Title VII.5 The plaintiff, a brokerage employee, submitted a licens-
ing/registration application to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to become
a registered securities representative. "3 The application contained an arbitration
clause."4 The plaintiff, instead of submitting to arbitration, brought suit in fed-
eral court alleging that his employer discharged him in violation of his rights
under the ADEA.55
The Court ruled that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."56 The Court reiter-
ated its view that a plaintiffs choice of forum did not affect his or her substan-
tive rights,57 and expressed that arbitration was a proper forum for causes of
action created by the anti-discrimination statutes.58 Before it held that the
agreement was enforceable, the Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims was inconsistent with the ADEA's
framework and would frustrate its purpose.59 The Court found there was no
contradiction between addressing the individual's grievances in arbitration and
the policies behind the ADEA.
60
49. Id.; White, supra note 47, at 1292. Likewise, in two cases decided after Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp., the Court treated "the right to a judicial forum as merely procedural." Id. at 1293 (citing
Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
50. 500U.S. 20(1991).
51. Matthews, supra note 19, at 363 (stating, "In 1991, the judicial metamorphosis from the
presumption against arbitration to one in favor of arbitration was virtually complete.").
52. Cihon & Wesman, supra note 12, at 5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id. at 26-27.
60. Id. at 27-28.
7
Wusinich: Compulsory Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses in the Employment Cont
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2004
The Court further stated that it was not overturning its earlier holding in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver.61 Alexander was distinguishable, in part, be-
cause it involved a disparity of interests between the union and the employee.62
In other words, because the employee himself had not agreed to arbitrate his
claims, and because the arbitrators were not authorized to resolve Title VII
claims, subsequent statutory actions were not precluded.63
As the Ninth Circuit later noted,' 4 Gilmer was clearly a shift from the
Court's position in Alexander.65  Accordingly, employers did not expect the
Court to rule as it did. 66 Based on the Court's previous holdings, employers
assumed employment contracts requiring compulsory arbitration of discrimina-
tion claims were illegal because such contracts denied employees claiming dis-
crimination the right to a public forum, which was viewed as a necessary means
of ensuring employers' compliance with the law.
67
D. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams6"
The Supreme Court's holding in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams resolved
the conflicting circuit court interpretations regarding the exclusion in Section 1
of the FAA. 69 The Court interpreted the FAA to apply to certain employment
contracts, signaling its continuing regard for arbitration as a means of resolving
employment disputes. 7' The Court found that the text of the FAA foreclosed the
Ninth Circuit's construction of Section 1, which excluded all employment con-
tracts from the FAA. 71 The Court stated, "there are real benefits to the enforce-
ment of arbitration provisions. We have been clear in rejecting the supposition
that the advantages of the arbitration process somehow disappear when trans-
ferred to the employment context. '72 Finally, the Court foresaw a slippery slope
61. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 34-35.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Luce, 345 F.3d at 748.
65. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36 (holding that a unionized employee's earlier exercise of the
compulsory arbitration provsion in a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude him from later
pursuing a Title VII discrimination claim in a judicial forum.).
66. White, supra note 47, at 1295.
67. Id.
68. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 119.
72. Id. at 122-23. The Court further touted the benefits of arbitration in resolving employment
disputes:
[a]rbitration agreements allow parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may
be of particular importance in employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums
of money than disputes concerning commercial contracts. These litigation costs to par-
ties (and the accompanying burden to the courts) would be compounded by the difficult
8
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with regards to adopting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation.73 In particular, the
Court stated that following the Ninth Circuit "would call into doubt the efficacy
of alternative dispute resolution procedures adopted by many of the Nation's
employers, in the process undermining the FAA's proarbitration purposes and
'breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it."'
74
E. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.75
The Court in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 76 addressed the scope of the
EEOC's power to litigate an employee's discrimination claim where an em-
ployee signed a mandatory arbitration agreement.7 7 In Waffle House, Baker, a
grill operator, suffered a seizure shortly after being hired; his employment was
promptly terminated. 78 Baker filed an action with the EEOC, and the EEOC
then sued Waffle House for violating Baker's rights under the ADA. Specifi-
cally, the EEOC claimed that Waffle House intentionally terminated Baker
based on his disability and had done so "with malice or reckless indifference to
his federally protected rights."79
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EEOC possessed the in-
dependent ability to bring the claim, but, in order to give some effect to the arbi-
tration agreement, only allowed the EEOC to seek injunctive relief.8 ° Victim-
specific or "make-whole" relief, according to the court, was precluded. 8' The
Supreme Court, however, after taking a close look at the EEOC's grant of au-
thority under Title VII, determined that the EEOC was expressly empowered to
seek monetary relief.82 Further, the Court found no language in Title VII sug-
gesting that the EEOC's power to bring suit should be limited by the existence
choice-of-law questions that are often presented in disputes arising from the employment
relationship.
Id. at 123.
73. id. at 123.
74. Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272-273 (1995)).
75. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Altenbemt, supra note 30, at 236-37.
79. Id. at 237.
80. Id. at 238.
81. Id.
82. Id. Both the 1964 CRA and the 1991 CRA contained authorization for the EEOC to
pursue monetary damages. Id. The 1991 CRA enabled plaintiffs to recover compensatory as well as
punitive damages. Id.
65
9
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of an arbitration agreement, thereby emphasizing the strength of the EEOC's
powers under the statute.83
In particular, held the court, the EEOC its capacity as a public agency,
rather than the individual claimant or the court, has the right to decide what
relief is appropriate and what would best serve the public interest.8 4 Allowing a
court to decide what relief is appropriate for serving the public interest would
violate the enforcement scheme implemented by Congress. 85 "Ultimately, the
Court held that whenever the EEOC chooses to file an action against an em-
ployer, it may seek to vindicate the public interest by pursuing all types of relief
granted it by statute. 86
IV. SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
Many courts interpreted the Alexander decision as precluding the manda-
tory arbitration of Title VII claims.87 Even as arbitration became increasingly
popular in the 1980's, every circuit court that addressed the issue refused to
enforce any agreement (in the collective bargaining context or otherwise) that
required employees to resolve discrimination claims in binding arbitration."
For a time, "[t]he circuit courts read [Alexander] as sending a simple message:
Title VII is different,"89 and due to the "unique nature of Title VII claims ... it
was the congressional intent that arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention
to the transcendent public interest in the enforcement of Title VII." 90 Nonethe-
less, in 2003, at the time Luce was decided, the federal circuit courts were split
regarding the arbitrability of statutory employment claims.9' The Ninth Circuit
was in the minority, holding that mandatory arbitration agreements in the em-
ployment context were not enforceable.92 This position is illustrated in the case
of Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.,9 3 discussed below. Not until the Ninth
83. Altenbernt, supra note 30, at 239.
84. Id..
85. Id. at 238.
86. Id. at 240.
87. Luce, 345 F.3d at 748.
88. Duffield, 144 F.3dat 1188.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Lowrey, supra note 10, at 1002.
92. Id. at 1005.
93. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1182. Notably, however, Duffield was not the first case in which the
Ninth Circuit challenged the Gilmer doctrine. In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai, the
court refused to require an employee to arbitrate her Title VII claim pursuant to her arbitration
agreement with her employer. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1995); Karas, supra note 9, at 88. Because the
agreement did not specify the disputes subject to arbitration, there was no "knowing and voluntary"
waiver of her right to a judicial forum. Id. Thus, compulsory arbitration of the claim was precluded.
Id.
10
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Circuit's decision in Luce would there be a consensus in the federal circuits
regarding the arbitrability of employment disputes.
A. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.
In this case, plaintiff Duffield, a female broker-dealer, sued her employer
for sex discrimination and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII.94 Prior to
bringing suit, Duffield signed an arbitration agreement waiving her right to a
judicial forum in all employment-related disputes, agreeing instead to arbitrate
such disputes pursuant to the stock exchange regulations her employer was re-
quired to follow.95
In deciding the case, the Ninth Circuit conducted an in-depth analysis of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Gilmer and Alexander, and also of the legislative
history of Title VII and the 1991 CRA.96 The court concluded that the 1991
CRA barred employers from compelling individuals to waive their Title VII
right to a judicial forum.97
B. EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps
In September 2003, the Ninth Circuit reversed its view of mandatory arbi-
tration agreements when it issued an en banc decision overturning Duffield.98
This decision aligned its view of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with that of
the other federal circuit courts. 99 The case arose as a result of defendant Luce
Forward's refusal to employ Donald Lagatree as a legal secretary after Lagatree
refused to sign an agreement mandating the arbitration of any claims stemming
from his employment., 0 The EEOC sued on behalf of Lagatree for make-whole
94. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1186.
95. Id. at 1185. Duffield's assent to the agreement was imposed as a condition of her em-
ployment and was mandated by the securities exchanges. Specifically, the agreement stated: "I
agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me or my firm, or a
customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-
laws of the organizations with which I register .. " Id. The stock exchanges referred to in the case
are the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD). Id.
96. Lowrey, supra note 10, at 1005. Duffield was one of the first opinions to adequately
analyze the legislative history of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
97. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
98. See Luce, 345 F.3d 742.
99. Ctr. for Pub. Res., Joining the Pack: En Banc Ninth Circuit Overturns Duffield, 21 Alter-
natives to the High Cost of Litigating 176 (2003).
100. See Luce, 345 F.3d at 745. Lagatree stated that he couldn't sign the arbitration agreement
because it "was unfair." Id. Specifically, he "believed he needed to retain his 'civil liberties, includ-
67
11
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relief, lost wages, and benefits, and also sought emotional distress damages and
punitive damages.'l' In addition, the EEOC requested a permanent injunction
forbidding the defendant from i) requiring employees to sign arbitration agree-
ments as a condition of employment and ii) engaging in unlawful retaliation." 2
The District Court enjoined Luce Forward from requiring applicants to
agree to arbitrate Title VII claims and from enforcing existing agreements to
arbitrate those claims.0 3 Luce Forward appealed, the EEOC cross-appealed,
and the holding was reversed by a three-judge panel ("Luce Forward P') which
held that "employers may require employees to sign agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims as a condition of their employment."'" The panel ("Luce For-
ward 11") reasoned that in Circuit City the Supreme Court implicitly overruled
Duffield."0 5 Citing the importance of the issue implicated, the court agreed to
rehear the case. 0 6 The court then withdrew the panel's opinion, disagreeing
with Luce Forward II that Circuit City overturned Duffield.'07 However, con-
cluding that Duffield was wrongly decided, the court stated, "we therefore over-
rule it ourselves."'
10 8
First, the Ninth Circuit explained that it was among the many courts which
interpreted Alexander as precluding employers from mandating agreements to
arbitrate Title VII claims. '09 Next, the court stated that Gilmer did not overrule
Alexander, but rather, rejected a reading of Alexander as prohibiting the arbitra-
tion of employment discrimination claims. "0 "In the post-Gilmer world," stated
the court, "our decision in Duffield stands alone. All of the other circuits have
concluded that Title VII does not bar compulsory arbitration agreements." ''
ing the right to a jury trial and redress of grievances through the government process."' Id.
Defendant told Lagatree that the arbitration agreement was a non-negotiable condition of employ-
ment; Lagatree still refused to sign it. Id. Luce Forward then withdrew its offer, and did not dispute
the claim that the only reason Lagatree was refused the job was due to his failure to sign the agree-
ment. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The claim for make-whole relief was refused by the court on resjudicata grounds. Id.
104. Luce, 345 F.3d at 744.
105. Id. at 744. The panel also rejected the EEOC's argument that Luce Forward's refusal to
hire Lagatree because of his refusal to sign the agreement constituted illegal retaliation. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. According to the court, Circuit City Stores did not address the question of whether
Congress had demonstrated an intent to preclude arbitration of Title VII claims. In the view of the
court, "Circuit City involved an entirely different issue: the reach of the exception in the FAA for
'contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in..
. interstate commerce."' The case did not involve a claim under Title VII or any other federal em-
ployment discrimination statute." Id.
108. Id. at 745.
109. Luce, 345 F.3d at 748.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 748-49. The court identified decisions of the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Fourth,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits-all supporting the arbitrability of Title VII claims. See e.g.,
68
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The court then reviewed its decision in Duffield and reconsidered its interpreta-
tion of the purpose and legislative history of the 1991 CRA and of the text of
Section 118.112
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENFORCING AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. The Legislative History of Title VII and the 1991 CRA Counsel Against En-
forcing Mandatory Arbitration Clauses
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Congress, in enacting Title
VII, envisioned that the federal courts would play a key role in advancing the
policy of deterring workplace discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and na-
tional origin." 3 In Alexander, the Court stated, "the purpose and procedures of
Title VII indicate that Congress intended federal courts to exercise final respon-
sibility for enforcement of Title VII."'" The Court further stated that "deferral
to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent with that goal.""' 5 In a subsequent
case, the Court stated that Alexander "established that arbitration 'cannot pro-
vide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal
statutory rights' embodied in Title VII.""'  As a result, at the time the 1991
CRA was drafted' and reported by the House Education and Labor Committee,
the overwhelming weight of the law made compulsory arbitration agreements of
Title VII claims unenforceable. 1 "
In the final 1991 CRA legislation, Congress directly addressed the arbitra-
tion of Title VII claims." 9 Specifically, Section 118 of the Act stated that "the
Sues v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding Title VII "entirely compati-
ble with applying the FAA to agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims").
112. Id.at748.
113. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1187 (citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S.
352, 358 (1995)).
114. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
115. Id.
116. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1188 (quoting McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290
(1984)).
117. Id. at 1194. The Duffield court noted that the time of the drafting of the Act was the
relevant time to consider when determining Congress's intent because by the time the 1991 CRA
was enacted, the intent had become less clear. Id.
118. Id. The 1991 CRA was enacted almost simultaneously with the Supreme Court's issuance
of Gilmer. Id.
119. Id.at1189.
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parties could 'where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,"'20 opt to
pursue alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration, to resolve their Title
VII disputes."' 2 ' However, Congress's intent with this "polite bow to the popu-
larity of alternative dispute resolution,"'' 22 as noted in Duffield, must be consid-
ered in light of the Act's overall purpose. As mentioned, the Act was designed
to overrule hostile Supreme Court decisions and make discrimination claims
easier to bring and to prove in the federal court system. 123  Congress exhibited
this purpose by substantially increasing the procedural rights and remedies
available to Title VII plaintiffs. 124 Thus, with regards to ADR and arbitration, it
follows that any encouragement of arbitration of employment disputes was
meant to apply to arbitrations that were voluntarily entered into by both the em-
ployer and the employee. 1
25
B. Arbitration is Not an Appropriate Method of Dispute Resolution for Resolv-
ing Statutory Claims
Congress' plan for eliminating discrimination under Title VII was twofold.
It sought both to deter potential employers from discriminatory actions and to
120. Id The court stated that this phrase was the critical statutory language in laying out the
Section's substantive limitations. Id. at 1193. Since "the law" as Congress understood it at the time
was to the effect that compulsory arbitration agreements were unenforceable, such agreements were
not "authorized by law" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 1194.
121. Duffield, 144F.3dat 1189.
122. Id. at 1191 (quoting Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997)).
123. Id. at 1192-93. "When 'examin[ing] the language of the governing statute,' we must not
be guided by a 'single sentence or member of a sentence,' but look[ ] to the provisions of the whole
law, and to its object and policy."' Id. at 1193 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1993) (alteration in original)).
124. Id. "The Act provided for the first time a right to damages and to trial by jury and ex-
panded Title VII's
fee-shifting provisions." Id. at 1191.
125. Id. at 1193. The Duffield court stated,
It thus would be 'at least a mild paradox' to conclude that in the very Act of which the
'primary purpose' was to 'strengthen existing protections and remedies available to em-
ployees, Congress encouraged the use of a process whereby employers condition em-
ployment on their prospective employees' surrendering their rights to a judicial forum for
the resolution of all future claims of race or sex discrimination and force those employees
to submit all such claims to compulsory arbitration. It seems far more plausible that
Congress meant to encourage voluntary agreements to arbitrate-agreements such as those
that employees and employers enter into after a dispute has arisen because both parties
consider arbitration to be a more satisfactory or expeditious method of resolving the dis-
agreement.
Id. (citations omitted). The court further noted that it would also be at least a mild paradox to inter-
pret Section 118 as encouraging compulsory arbitration, when the Section's other encouraged types
of alternative dispute resolution-'settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-
finding, [and] minitrials'-are all consensual." Id. (citations omitted).
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remedy individual acts of discrimination when deterrence failed. 126 By focusing
solely on the statute's remedial purpose, the post-Gilmer cases have been criti-
cized for failing to consider the broader goals of the laws.' 27 "The Gilmer deci-
sion effectively modified the inquiry from considering public policy to consider-
ing the fairness of the arbitration forum in effecting remediation of the statutory
injury." 128
In two subsequent cases, the Court applied this new analysis and enforced
arbitration agreements addressing statutory claims. 129 While the Court did not
entirely abandon public policy considerations, it redefined them by assuming
that providing effective remedies to individuals satisfies the broader public goals
of the law. 3 ° Gilmer assumed that deterring employment discrimination could
be achieved as long as the individual claiming discrimination had a fair opportu-
nity to remedy his employer's wrongs.131
The Gilmer assumption, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, for
the reasons enumerated below, arbitration does not always provide a claimant a
fair opportunity to prove discrimination by his employer. 13 2 Second, as will be
discussed in sub-part C, arbitration is an inherently unsuitable mechanism for
achieving the civil rights statutes' broader public goals, such as deterrence.
Crucial differences between arbitration and litigation can substantially af-
fect the resolution of a plaintiff s Title VII claim. First, employers tend to be at
an advantage in an arbitration proceeding due to the fact that arbitrating a dis-
pute is a profitable venture."' While arbitration has traditionally been con-
ducted by non-profit firms and pro-bono neutrals, it is now dominated by private
for-profit arbitration organizations. 1"' Arbitrators are normally attorneys or
retired judges who are paid by the organization to hear a particular dispute. '35 In
what has been deemed the "repeat player syndrome,"'36 private arbitrators have
126. See Moohr, supra note 12, at 413.
127. Id. at 417-19.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 413.
130. Id. at 418.
131. Moohr, supra note 12, at 410; Joseph Z. Fleming and Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Arbitration
of Employment Disputes After Circuit City, SJ037 ALI-ABA 623, 649 (2003) (noting that Gilmer
held, "[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent func-
tion."). Id.
132. Hai Jiang, Do We Allow Contract Law to Administer Civil Rights Remedies? Casenote on
Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 2003 L. REv. MICH. ST. U. 251, 272-75 (2003).
133. Id. at 274.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Karas, supra note 8, at 108.
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an incentive to favor institutional clients (usually large corporations) lest they
risk losing repeat business.'37 In other words, "arbitrators are often reluctant to
find against employers or award large damages for fear of not being invited
back."' In this regard, an arbitrator is less likely to be a neutral decision-maker
than a judge or jury.'39
Second, claimants in an arbitration are less likely to have their claim heard
by someone familiar with the laws pertinent to their case. 40 The competence of
arbitrators in employment discrimination cases has been the source of much
criticism because arbitrators are not always well-versed in the substantive law
implicated by the dispute.' 4' In addition, even if the arbitrators have prior
knowledge of the relevant statutes and cases, they are not required to follow
them.'42 This gives them wide latitude in interpreting the law and rendering an
award,'43 often to the claimant's disadvantage.'"
Next, the overall fact-finding process in an arbitration is not equivalent to
that of judicial fact-finding.'45 "The record of the arbitration proceedings is not
as complete . . . and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as dis-
covery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable."' 46 The lack of formal discovery proce-
dures in arbitration leaves discovery to the discretion of the arbitrator and often
places the employee at a disadvantage.' 47 For instance, employees may find
themselves confronted with discovery matters that would be excluded if the
claim were brought in a judicial forum. 4 It is also significant that the employer
137. Jiang, supra note 132, at 274.
138. Karas, supra note 8, at 109 (quoting T. Shawn Taylor, More Employers Force Workers
into Arbitration- But is it Fair?, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 2002, §5, at 5).
139. Id. at 108.
140. See id. at ll O.
141. Id. at 110. In the securities context, for example, neither the NASD nor the NYSE neces-
sarily considers whether arbitrators have expertise in the subject matter of the underlying dispute.
Jiang, supra note 168, at 274. This is despite the recommendation by the Securities Industry Con-
ference on Arbitration (SICA) that arbitrators should be knowledgeable in that area of the law. Id.
Panels selected by the NASD or the NYSE have a tendency to consist of white males, sixty years old
or older, with securities backgrounds and without any training in employment issues. Id. Some
question whether these individuals will be impartial. Id.
142. Id. at 110.
143. Jiang, supra note 132, at 273.
144. See id. at 274-75.
145. Karas, supra note 8, at 112.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Steven S. Poindexter, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Title VII:
Promoting Efficiency While Protecting Employee Rights, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 301, 312. Id
148. Id. A prime example is sexual harassment cases, in which federal law and many state
laws exclude evidence of a plaintiffs consensual sexual activity with persons other than the ha-
rasser. Id. An arbitrator, however, is not required to abide by this evidentiary rule and can permit
the employer to "forage where it desires in a plaintiff's private conduct." Id.
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usually controls the majority of relevant evidence in the case, such as evidence
showing pretext or discriminatory conduct. 1
49
But, perhaps the most significant difference between the forums is with re-
spect to review of decisions. While a party dissatisfied with the decision ren-
dered in an arbitration proceeding may bring an action to have the award va-
cated, "judicial review of an arbitration award under the FAA ... has been de-
scribed as 'among the narrowest known to the law."""0  An award will be over-
turned only if there has been a "manifest disregard for the law" or if it conflicts
with public policy by violating positive public law.' 5' "Manifest disregard"
occurs when the arbitrator knows the law, yet refuses to apply it. '1 2 This high
threshold for overturning an arbitrator's ruling increases the likelihood that pro-
cedural irregularities will go uncorrected.' 53 If the irregularity is not gross
enough to justify vacating the arbitration award on non-statutory or statutory
grounds, the parties are left without a remedy.'54
149. Id.
150. White, supra note 47, at 1298.
151. Id. at 1299. Manifest disregard of the law and public policy are the nonstatutory grounds
for vacating an award. Id. The FAA also provides grounds, albeit limited, for overturning an arbi-
trator's award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there
was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the ar-
bitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient
cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudice; or (4)
where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mu-
tual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(l)-(4) (2002).
152. White, supra note 47, at 1300. "Manifest disregard" means more than error or misunder-
standing of the law. Id. A number of courts have embraced a two-step approach to manifest regard:
to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitra-
tors knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,
and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applica-
ble to the case.
Id. (citing Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998)).
153. Jiang, supra note 132, at 275. In such cases, adjudication of discriminatory claims is
unjust because the court will not have the discretion under FAA policy to deny enforcement of the
arbitration agreement. Id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002).
154. Jiang, supra note 132, at 275.
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C. Arbitration is Not a Proper Mechanism for Enforcing the Anti-
Discrimination Laws.
Not only is the arbitral forum often inadequate for resolving individual
employment discrimination disputes, it is also not a sound means of achieving
the broader public goals of the civil rights statutes.' 55 Three important mecha-
nisms for enforcing the anti-discrimination laws (deterrence, development of the
law, and education of the public) are sacrificed when an individual claimant is
required to arbitrate his employment discrimination claim. '56
First, the deterrent function of resolving an employment discrimination
claim can be achieved only as part of an open and public process.'57 In the civil
adjudication system, both the process and the result are public.'58 On the other
hand, arbitration is private both in the nature of the proceedings as well as the
outcome.'59 Only the parties and their representatives may attend an arbitra-
tion, 16' and no public record of the parties' filings, the hearing, or the award is
created.' 61 Courts, on the other hand, provide notice of the identity of the con-
duct of violators when they issue public decisions and orders.162 When a public
judgment is rendered against a violator of the anti-discrimination laws, other
employers are deterred from engaging in similar behavior.163 Law-abiding em-
ployers, because they fear that they too might be stigmatized by consumers and
potential employers who will observe practices that they oppose and take actions
which affect the employer's profitability, 164 are motivated to continue following
the law.'65 "As has been illustrated time and time again, the risks of negative
publicity and blemished business reputation can be powerful influences on be-
havior."1
66
The availability to the public of information on discrimination disputes is
essential to this system; 167 potential violators made aware of sanctions imposed
155. See Moohr, supra note 12, at 426.
156. See id. at 426-27.
157. Id. at 432.
158. Id. at 402.
159. Id.
160. Moohr, supra note 12, at 402. Generally, arbitration awards are simple statements of the
disposition of the claims, and do not enumerate the reason supporting the award. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Moohr, supra note 12, at 431.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 430-431.
166. EEOC Notice 915.002, supra note 221, IV., C.
167. Moohr, supra note 12, at 438. Moohr offers a good example of how the law could be
easily misunderstood, thus underscoring the need for an open process and dissemination of informa-
tion and records to employers and the public.
For example, an employer may believe it did not discriminate against an employee if it
made [an] adverse employment decision without racial animus. The law, however, does
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on similarly situated employers can calculate the costs and benefits of engaging
in prohibited conduct.'68 Conversely, private arbitration proceedings, which do
not apprise similar entities or the public of who has violated the law and in what
manner they have violated it, "effectively forfeit[] the enforcement mechanisms
of spillover deterrence and stigmatization . . . .""' Thus, in addition to provid-
ing remedies for the particular discrimination victims,7 the courts play a criti-
cal role in preventing future violations of the law. 7'
Second, when an employment discrimination case is arbitrated, the public is
deprived of further development of the body of employment discrimination case
law."72 Litigation occurs within a unified hierarchical system which utilizes past
judgments to govern decisions in future cases.'73 This process, called stare de-
cisis, guarantees deference to prior interpretations; decisions are not lightly re-
versed. ' The litigation forum, i.e. the trial court, is constrained from the outset
because the system allows an appellate court to review the legal bases of its
decisions.'75 The arbitral forum, however, is "a unique, isolated event that is not
subject to review . . . arbitrators neither create nor apply precedent."' 76 While
judges in their decisions articulate general principles and rules to be used in
deciding future disputes, 177 arbitrators do not formulate principles that are to be
applied to anyone outside of the immediate dispute. 78  Arbitrators thus do not
contribute to the development of a comprehensive body of employment law.
Further, in arbitration, development of the law is stifled'79 because an arbitra-
not require a hateful motive ... the action may have been a result of unconscious dis-
crimination, [but] courts focus on the effect of the employer's conduct.
Id.
168. Id. at 4 31.
169. Id. at 432.
170. Courts characterize individual litigants in employment discrimination cases as "private
attorneys general." EEOC Notice 915.002 (1997), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html. A civil rights plaintiff bringing his claim in court
serves not only his or her private interest, but also functions as "the chosen instrument of Congress
to vindicate 'a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority."' Id. (quoting Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opp'y Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978)).
171. EEOC Notice 915.002, supra note 221, IV., C. ("By awarding damages, back pay, and
injunctive relief as a matter of public record, the courts not only compensate victims of discrimina-
tion, but provide notice to the community, in a very tangible way, of the costs of discrimination.").
172. Moohr, supra note 12, at 432-33.
173. ld. at 403.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 436.
178. Moohr, supra note 12, at 435.
179. Id. at 436.
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tor's award is rarely reviewed."8 ' The public litigation system, on the other
hand, provides a "correcting hierarchy,"'' because if a court misinterprets the
law, its mistaken reasoning is evident in judicial opinions and the public re-
cord,8 2 allowing appellate courts to review the decision or Congress to change
the law with legislation.8 3 This correcting mechanism is unique to the judicial
forum; no such system exists for arbitration. 184 Each arbitrator is independent,
and his decision is often "not required to be written or reasoned."' 85
Third, when a case is arbitrated, the public is deprived of a decision-maker
who is accountable to it. This stems from the fact that the civil justice system
derives its authority over civil disputes from the state's power to govern,'86
while arbitration is not authorized by state power. '87 Specifically, judges are
selected by a process based on indirect public participation and consent.'88 They
are public agents whose decisions are official acts.'89 Thus, with respect to their
decisions, judges are accountable to the public, to courts above them, and to
Congress. 9 ' In contrast, arbitrators are individuals acting in a private capacity;
they are selected by the parties to render a judgment and are accountable only to
those parties. ''
In sum, even if the claimant is able to have his claim fairly adjudicated in an
arbitration proceeding, the public's interest is not as effectively vindicated as it
would be had the claim been decided in the court system.'92 Thus, the Supreme
Court's assumption, that "[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function,"'93 is clearly
flawed.
180. See Jiang, supra note 132, at 275.
181. Moohr, supra note 12, at 437.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. American Arbitration Association, EEOC Rejects Mandatory Binding Employment Arbi-
tration, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 11, 12 (1997). Generally, arbitration awards are simple statements of the
disposition of the claims, and do not enumerate the reason supporting the award. Moohr, supra note
17, at 402.
186. Moohr, supra note 12, at 402.
187. Id. (stating, "Arbitrators receive their authority to render a binding decision from the
agreement of the parties to abide by that decision.").
188. Id. at 402.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at439.
193. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (alteration in original) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at
637).
76
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D. Enforcing Compulsory Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination
Claims Undermines the Goals of the Anti-Discrimination Statutes and the FAA
It has taken twenty-five years for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to
emerge as a quicker, less expensive, and in many instances, more effective
means of resolving disputes.'94 ADR combines several methodologies, includ-
ing "arbitration, mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, negotiation, dispute pre-
vention, neutral experts . . . ombudsmen, and private judges."' 95 Although the
public is more aware of ADR at present, for most citizens with a grievance,
suing in court is a time-honored tradition.196
In order for ADR to continue developing and for its benefits197 to be fully
realized, it must be embraced by the legal community and the public as "an al-
ternative middle ground between the vagaries of the full-blown adversary sys-
tem and the controlled flexibility of purely private settlement negotiations. '
To accomplish this, it is important that ADR methods are not perceived as a
threat to individual rights. '99 Indeed, many perceive arbitration in this light. For
example, the EEOC and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have taken
positions against compulsory pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 20 Lawyers also
have objected to binding arbitration for employment disputes on the grounds
that arbitration in this context circumvents constitutional and statutory rights.20 '
Some courts feel the same way; one court recently stated, "Given the sacredness
... of the fundamental right to trial by jury, any contract provision that openly
194. Joseph T. McLaughlin, et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes,
SJ034 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 559, 561 (2003) (noting how "ADR has grown from a dimly recognized con-
cept to a variety of practices spurred by the desire to resolve legal battles outside the courtroom.").
195. Id.
196. Id. See infra note 315.
197. McLaughlin, et. al. supra note 194, at 561. ADR is often a substitute for corporate litiga-
tion which consumes a disproportionate amount ofjudicial and other legal resources. Id. at 562.
198. Id. at 561.
199. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Ed., Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbi-
tration, 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 279, 310 (2004) (stating,
[T]he importance to U.S. citizens of having their day in court [is] a fundamental tenet of
the U.S. justice system .... The 'right' to one's 'day in court' is a socially learned ex-
pectation and a powerful cultural norm.... U.S. citizens may expect to have a court de-
cide the merits of their disputes according to the rules of law unless they agree otherwise
... many are shocked and dismayed when they learn that they no longer have that right.
(citations omitted)).
200. Matthews, supra note 19, at 355-56.
201. McElroy, supra note 8, at 1036. For example, a group of California labor lawyers threat-
ened to boycott any ADR firm that participates in binding arbitration of employment disputes. Id.
Similarly, the National Employment Lawyers' Association threatened a broad attack against ADR
firms in order to inhibit the use of binding arbitration clauses. Id.
77
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or subtly causes the forfeiture of the exercise of this right must be rigorously
examined by the courts... Indeed, the use of such contractual provisions is...
an 'open attack' on the right of jury trial ....,2 Most telling, however, is the
fact that even ADR professionals debate about whether they should arbitrate
employment discrimination claims.203
Likewise, avoiding the creation of misconceptions and a sense of mistrust
about ADR methods is important to the FAA's goal of placing arbitration
agreements on "equal footing" with other contracts.2" Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court, in its line of decisions starting with Gilmer seems to assume that
broadening the subject matter of disputes to be resolved by arbitration, and fa-
voring arbitration in any context (including statutory employment disputes)
furthers the goals of the FAA. But, "[T]he Court's lack of analysis is most un-
fortunate because it demonstrates a lack of appreciation of the different roles of
arbitrators and courts and the impact of those differences on the policies which
underlie most employment statutes.""2 5  In reality, mandating arbitration in a
context which is perceived to deprive individuals of important procedural rights
runs counter to the FAA's goal of giving arbitration agreements the same status
as other contracts.20 6
Also, in analyzing the Court's pro-arbitration decisions, it is important to
recall that the FAA was initially drafted to provide an alternative to litigation in
the commercial environment °. 2 7 At common law, merchants were understood to
possess equal bargaining power, hence arbitration was a swift and inexpensive
means of resolving their disputes. 2t ' However, employer-employee disputes
were generally perceived as one-sided. 2° Presumably, then, the FAA was not
meant to apply to situations involving parties who were not bargaining on equal
terms, such as in the employer-employee context..2 " For the aforementioned
202. Karas, supra note 8, at Il l (quoting Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont.
2002) (Leaphart, J. concurring)).
203. Matthews, supra note 19, at 354-55. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), for
example, has focused on developing employment dispute resolution systems that encourage greater
use of voluntary methods. Id. at 354. Because one of the strongest criticisms against compulsory
arbitration is the lack of due process protections, "the AAA has endorsed a 'due process protocol'
setting out procedural protections ...." Id. Another organization, JAMS, has also "adopted a
policy on arbitration ensuring an employee's right to an attorney, discovery, statutory remedies, and
participation in selecting the arbitrator." Id.
204. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted).
205. Karas, supra note 8, at 109 (commenting on the Court's dismissal in Gilmer of the argu-
ment that allowing arbitrators to determine statutory rights would impede the development of the
law, and quoting Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77,99 (1996)).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 108.
208. Id. at 107-108.
209. Id. at 107-08.
210. See id. at 108.
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reasons, requiring arbitration in employment disputes challenges the stated goals
and original intent of the FAA.
VI. PENDING LEGISLATION
The uniform judicial determination after Luce, that mandatory agreements
to arbitrate employment discrimination claims are enforceable, could be affected
by legislation. The EEOC's vehement opposition to the enforcement of the
agreements has the effect of pitting the executive branch against the judicial
branch, and leaves Congress to resolve the dispute."'
During the first session of the 10 8 th Congress, a bill was introduced propos-
ing to amend the FAA to allow employees to accept or reject the use of arbitra-
tion to resolve an employment controversy. 212 Specifically, H.R. 540 would
require that notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate, arbitration could be used
to settle an employment dispute only (i) upon submission of a written request by
one party to the other(s) after the dispute arises, and (ii) after the served party
consents in writing within a 60-day response period.2"3 Further, the bill would
prohibit an employer from requiring arbitration as a condition of employment.2 4
However, no action has been taken on H.R. 540 since early 2003 when the bill
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Commercial
and Administrative Law for further review and comment.21 5
More recently, during the current session of the 1 0 8 th Congress, S. 2088 was
introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts.2 16 A provision in this
omnibus civil rights bill, entitled the "Civil Rights Act of 2004," would make
arbitration clauses in employment contracts unenforceable unless the parties
knowingly and voluntarily consent to arbitration after the dispute arises. 217 The
bill was referred to the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions for further consideration. Shortly after the activity surrounding S.
2088, an identical measure, H.R. 3809, was introduced in the House and referred
to the Subcommittee on Education Reform.2"8
211. Matthews, supra note 19, at 357.
212. H.R. 540, 108th Cong. (2003).
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. S. 2088, 108th Cong. (2004).
217. Id. § 513 (2004). Collective bargaining agreements are also excepted from the bill's pro-
hibition on mandatory arbitration agreements between employers and employees. Id.at § 513(b).
218. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004).
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While measures similar to these have been proposed in previous sessions of
Congress only to die in committee, 219 it is worth noting that a significant num-
ber of Senators and Representatives, in naming themselves as cosponsors of S.
2088 and H.R. 3809, have already indicated their commitment to passing the
legislation.22' This was not the case with the aforementioned legislation.22" '
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The Ninth's Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Luce signifies the judici-
ary's unified view regarding the issue of compulsory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in the employment discrimination context. Employers nationwide can
now anticipate, with a degree of certainty, that contracts requiring an em-
ployee's waiver of the right to a judicial forum for claims arising under Title VII
or other anti-discrimination statutes will be enforced. However, the issues
which gave rise to the pre-Luce split persist; the arguments against enforcing
mandatory arbitration provisions in employment contracts remain valid. As
such, the courts will likely be asked to revisit the issue.
In the meantime, in order to further the goals of the civil rights statutes (i.e.
to the extent that private forums are capable of furthering the one goal of making
it easier for claimants to bring and prove discrimination actions), it is important
that certain safeguards are currently incorporated into arbitration proceedings.
Procedures such as those required by the Supreme Court of California in Ar-
mendariz v. Foundation Psychare Services, Inc.222 provide a more appropriate
means for resolving disputes because they protect important rights of employees
bringing discrimination actions. As one commentator suggested, "The em-
ployee, at a minimum, should have the right to make an informed choice regard-
219. McLaughlin, et al., supra note 194, at 582. For instance, Rep. Kucinich introduced the
Preservation of Civil Rights Act of 2001 in the aftermath of the Court's decision in Circuit City
Stores. H.R. 2282, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill would have exempted all employment contracts
from the scope of the FAA, thereby allowing parties to voluntarily consent to arbitration after a
claim arises. Id. The bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Rela-
tions, but no further action was taken before that session of Congress adjourned. Id.
220. Currently, twenty-six Senators are cosponsors of S. 2088. S. 2088, 108th Cong. (2004).
102 Representatives are cosponsors of the companion bill. H.R. 3809, 108th Cong. (2004).
221. H.R. 540, 108th Cong. (2003). H.R. 540 had no House cosponsors. Id.
222. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000). In Armendariz, the court set forth five minimum re-
quirements for the lawful arbitration of statutory civil rights in the workplace. Id. at 759. The
arbitration agreement will be lawful if it:
(1) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) re-
quires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be
available in court, and (5) does not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or
any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.
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ing the use of arbitration after the dispute as arisen." 223 In short, such safe-
guards promote fairness to employees which is otherwise lacking when pre-
dispute arbitration clauses are enforced to mandate arbitration of statutory dis-
crimination claims.
In the alternative, other methods of ADR are appropriate and can play an
important role in resolving employment discrimination disputes. Private com-
panies which, in lieu of compulsory arbitration, have implemented ADR pro-
grams responsive to employee rights state that programs involving mediation,
peer panels, and management review boards, resulted in the resolution of a large
percentage of their employment disputes.224
Until actions such as these are taken, the FAA's goal of placing arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts will not be accomplished.
Also in the interim, employers' and courts' compelling the resolution of em-
ployees' discrimination claims threatens the significant progress made by the
ADR movement over the past decades.
223. Karas, supra note 8, at 106 (emphasis added). This would deal with the problem of the
pre-dispute nature of the mandatory arbitration agreement, which results in an involuntary and
unknowing waiver of the employee's rights. See id.
224. McLaughlin, et al., supra note 194, at 566.
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